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Abstract
This paper combines models and ideas from radio-engineering literature
and economics to address the need for regulation of spectrum allocation in a
commons scenario. It discusses under what conditions a laissez-faire policy
towards spectrum usage would engender the ineﬃciencies of a spectrum com-
mons allocation regime; to overcome such potential ineﬃciency, centralised
allocation or a formal market for spectrum (with well-deﬁned property rights)
is required.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L10, L50, L96
Keywords: mesh networks, spectrum allocation, spectrum commons model.
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A central broad theme in the literature on the economics of radio spectrum addresses
the need for the regulation of spectrum allocation, and whether a laissez-faire policy
towards spectrum usage would engender the ineﬃciencies of a traditional commons
outcome. The concept of the spectrum commons and some of the associated prob-
lems have been well documented, an example of this discussion is provided by Webb
and Cave (2003) who ask where we should draw the line between laissez-faire and
regulation.
The so-called tragedy of the commons arises because of the interaction between
capacity constraints and unfettered use of this scarce capacity. In the context of
radio spectrum, Shannon s Law (Shannon (1948)) has traditionally been taken to
place an upper bound on spectrum capacity and, thus, imply a potential commons
problem for laissez-faire policies. In fact, more recent engineering literature has
extended Shannon s seminal work and models now exist where, in principle, the
capacity constraint can be relaxed. This may appear when mobile receivers act
simultaneously as transmitters (as relays); as in the case of some mesh networks.
From an economic viewpoint, these results can be related to the fact that con-
sumers can simultaneously produce demand-side and supply-side externalities. Thus,
the more consumers use a service, i.e. with increasing number of users or active
transceiving nodes, the overall throughput within the network increases.
This paper shows how such models can be combined with economics to inves-
tigate the potential for a tragedy (or a triumph) of the commons under laissez-
faire policy framework. Our approach provides an interesting illustration of the
research philosophy outlined above: precise modelling helps identify key informa-
tion that needs to be known before a decision can be made of where to draw the
line between property rights and commons policies towards spectrum. For example,
the distribution of users may be important in producing an eﬃcient mesh network,
or the propensity for delay may matter, or perhaps one can strategically populate
hot-spots to remove potential congestion. Our work may also have more immediate
1policy implications to the extent that (currently popular) wireless LANs, in terms of
overall throughput can be regarded as are inferior to mesh networks and that there
is economic beneﬁt from setting aside spectrum for experimenting with a commons
approach.
2 Spectrum Property Rights Versus a Commons
Model
Benkler (2002) describes a ‘traditional model’ of communication based on the lone,
stupid receiver (LSR). Here ‘lone’ refers to the fact that all signals are send directly
from the sender to the receiver and ‘stupid’ to the inability of the receiver to distin-
guish between electromagnetic radiation of the same frequency and power. The LSR
can then send and receive intelligible messages only if the spectrum management
regime restricts individuals to radiate at a particular frequency, power, location and
time-frame.1
He then argues that two main reasons why the traditional model is no longer
applicable. The ﬁrst is that the dramatic decrease in the cost of computation means
that receivers are able to distinguish signals of the same frequency and power by
using computationally intensive (but no longer expensive) encoding and decoding
techniques. The second reason is the existence of cooperation or diversity gains
between users of a particular network where a network is a group of users who are
both senders and receivers of signals situated at nodes communicating with each
other over wireless channels without any centralized control of traﬃc ﬂow.
A crucial issue for the viability of a commons model is the relationship between
throughput, deﬁned as the average amount of information (bits) per second that can
1Our model of spectrum prices and channel trading in Section 3 and 4 respectively is, in the
Benkler sense, a traditional model in that we assume that operators needs to transmit at diﬀer-
ent frequencies to avoid destructive interference and each purchases a licence to use a particular
channel in a particular time frame. By implication the LSR does not employ sophisticated and
computationally intensive interference mitigation schemes.
2be transmitted by every sender node to its chosen destination node, and the number
of nodes. This will involve a scheduling policy with a possible delay, T, and relaying.
The precise deﬁnition of feasible throughput is as follows:
Deﬁnition: Feasible Throughput. Let n be the number of nodes. Then λ(n)
bit/sec for every node is feasible if there is a scheduling policy such that by operating
the network in a multi-hop fashion and buﬀering at intermediate nodes when await-
ing transmission there is a time T < ∞ such that in every interval [tT,(t + 1)T],
t = 1,2,· · ·, every node can send Tλ(n) bits to its chosen destination node.2
In the following section we survey work by Gupta and Kumar (2000) and Gross-
glauser and Tse (2002) that models the throughput λ(n) using mesh technnologies.
Since locations are random we need to formulate throughput in probability terms as
probability limits. Then we examine the implication of these results for the existence
of coordination gains and for the possible existence of a ‘tragedy of the commons’.
3 Feasible Throughput in a Network
3.1 Shannon’s Theorem and the Tramsmission Constraint
We start with the basic theorem due to Shannon (1948) (theorem 17, page 43) and
others relating the maximum capacity (C), bandwidth (B), power of the signal (P)
and background (white) noise (N) for a single receiver as






This means that in order to transmit at a rate of R bits per sec, the signal-to-noise
ratio, P










B − 1 = β ≡ β(R/B); β
′(·) > 0 (2)
2This deﬁnition implies that nodes are ‘semi-intelligent’, processing and routing data.
3In (2), β is the minimum signal-to-noise ratio (or signal-to-interference ratio, SIR)
that is required for successful communication by a single receiver. β(·) is an increas-
ing function of R
B so that for a given rate of transmission, the minimum SIR falls as
more bandwidth is provided.
Now consider a network of n nodes lying in the disk of unit area of radius 1 √
π.
Each node transmits using a common radio channel of bandwidth B. The location
of the ith node at time t is Xi(t). Nodes are randomly located and this randomness
is crucial for the results on throughput. Nodes can either be ﬁxed, as in Gupta and
Kumar (2000); or mobile as in Grossglauser and Tse (2002). For the case of ﬁxed
node positions, {Xi} are identically and independently distributed and uniformly
distributed over the disk of unit area. For example if the centre of the disk is at
(0,0) then coordinates (xi,yi) for node i are chosen with xi and yi independently
and uniformly distributed over (−1,1). For the case of mobile nodes the location of
the ith node at time t is given by Xi(t) where the process {Xi(t)} is a stationary
and ergodic uniform3 distribution on the disk.
At time t, each of the n nodes is either a source or a destination node. Let Pi(t)
be the transmit power of node i such that the received power at node j is Pi(t)γij(t).
Let N0 be the background noise. Then applying (2) to nodes i and j, the condition





> β (R/B) (3)
A standard result (see Gupta and Kumar (2000) and Grossglauser and Tse (2002))




| Xi(t) − Xj(t) |α (4)
3That is, the probability density function is constant over time and these densities can be
calculated by time averaging, over t, rather than than ensemble averaging, over i. Of course, it
is possible that this approach to the distribution of nodes is not applicable in the case of mobile
radio. In particular, the distribution of mobile terminals ‘follows’ population distributions and
major trunk routes. Further research is suggested to examine these claims in detail.
4A further consideration is the existence of processing gain L > 1 which has
the eﬀect of making the signal received by node j from i appear more powerful
owing to the use of encoding. This has the eﬀect of reducing the interference from






> β (R/B) (5)
Processing gain L increases with the bandwidth of the common channel used by the
network. Assume for simplicity that all nodes transmit at the same power. Then
Putting N0 = Pi(t) = P(t) and combining (4) and (5) it can be seen that trans-
mission from i to j will be unsuccessful if there is another node Xk simultaneously
transmitting within a distance.
| Xk − Xj |≤ (β/L)
1
α | Xi − Xj | (6)
That is, there cannot be another sender in a disk proportional to the transmission
distance, | Xi−Xj | by a factor (β/L)
1
α. For a given transmission rate R, this factor
decreases easing the constraint if the bandwidth increases, reducing the minimum
SIR β required, or if α increases, thus increasing the rate at which the channel gain
γij falls over distance, or if the processing gain L increases. Figure 1 illustrates this
constraint.
Information can be transmitted either directly from a source to its destination
or can be relayed through one or more other nodes. Assume that all nodes transmit
at the same power P. In the absence of cooperation transmissions must be direct.
With cooperation the network members can appoint a coordinator or scheduler who
chooses an optimal relay policy consisting of a choice of transmitting nodes and their
relay path to the required destination. Now consider separately ﬁxed and mobile
nodes.
3.2 Fixed Nodes
For ﬁxed nodes long-range direct transmissions between many pairs is infeasible due
to excessive interference. Then in the absence of coordination, the only way the
5Figure 1: The Transmission Constraint. Successful i − j transmission if
nearest other node is at A, but unsuccessful transmission if at B
network can function is introduce more radio channels. With coordination and a
common channel, most communication has to occur between nearest neighbours at
distances of order 1 √
n with each message being relayed by the scheduler through
many intermediate nodes. Then Gupta and Kumar (2000) show:
Result 1. For ﬁxed nodes with relaying, there exists a constant c inde-














nlognλ(n) converges in probability to cR as n → ∞. We shall
loosely refer to this as plimλ(n) = cR √
nlogn.
3.3 Mobile Nodes
Grossglauser and Tse (2002) consider the case of mobile nodes where the process
{Xi(·)} are i.i.d., stationary and ergodic. Without relaying, the number of concur-
rent transmissions over long distances is still interference limited, but with mobility
6any two nodes can be expected to be close to each other from time to time. Then
Grossglauser and Tse (2002) obtain the result
Result 2. For mobile nodes without relaying, there exists a constant c′









2 R is feasible
o
= 1 (8)
Now allow mobility and coordination. Then with relaying a result of remarkable
importance is obtained:
Result 3. For mobile nodes with relaying, there exists a constant c′′




′′R is feasible} = 1 (9)
Thus throughput converges in probability to a non-zero positive constant as n → ∞.
Thus in the limiting large numbers case, adding nodes does not actually reduce
anyone’s capacity to use the system; every consumer brings with her an additional
input that eliminates the scarcity of bandwidth.
Table 1 summarises these three results. It is the entry for coordination across
mobile nodes that perhaps contains the most economic interest. Eﬀectively, this
says that every consumer of ‘mobile’ services (however deﬁned) is also a producer
of these services since s/he can be used to transmit information between other par-
ties. Thus, as well as the demand-side externalities traditionally associated with
communications systems, we have identiﬁed coincident supply-side externalities as
well. These externalities may be a feature of extended network settings inﬂuencing
the operation of the given network (e.g. see Cave et al. (2002)).
Cooperation (Relaying) Non-Cooperation
Fixed Nodes plim λ(n) = cR √
nlogn nodes require separate channels




Table 1: Cooperation Gains between Network Users
74 Cooperation gains: Tragedy of the Commons
or a Triumph of Cooperation Gains?
Given feasible throughput λ(n) as a function of the number of users n, the possi-
bility of a tragedy of the commons can now be investigated. Let p be the value of
transmitting each bit/sec. Let κ be the total cost of establishing each radio link in
the network. Then the in terms of probability limits (dropping the preﬁx ‘plim’)
the value of total traﬃc is given by
V (n) = pnλ(n) − κn (10)
In a free-entry equilibrium users will join the network until the value per user is
V (n)
n
= pλ(n) − κ = 0 (11)
If λ(n) is decreasing in n then this has a solution at n = ne, say.











If λ(n) is decreasing in n and λ′′(n) < 0, then the social optimum n = n∗ exists
and n∗ < ne; i.e., the free-entry equilibrium results in too many users in the net-
work compared with the social optimum and there is a tragedy of the commons as
illustrated in Figure 2. This is the case if nodes are ﬁxed with relaying and mobile
without relaying. Then there is a role for a spectrum regulator to issue spectrum
licences to transmit on the common bandwidth to only n∗ < ne users.
To take an example suppose that nodes are mobile but there is no relaying so
that in the probability limit λ(n) = c′n
− 1
1+ α

































For α = 2 then n∗
ne = 1
4 which rises as α increases until as α → ∞ the free-entry
equilibrium converges to the social optimum. The reason for this is that as α
increases, interference becomes more localised and less of an externality. In the
limit as α becomes inﬁnite, this externality disappears altogether.
However if nodes are randomly mobile as in Grossglauser and Tse (2002), λ(n) =
c′′ in the probability limit. Users will keep joining the network indeﬁnitely without
any loss of throughput. This is achieved through relaying and enhanced cooperation,
so the tragedy of the commons is transformed into a triumph of network cooperation
and the role for the regulator disappears.
It should be stressed that this is a theoretical result based on a restricted set
of assumptions of the model, particularly regarding the distribution of the mobile
nodes. Furthermore, this triumphal outcome is limited to the cases where either
one technology (e.g. mesh) is deployed or there is a common air interface to which
all technologies subscribe. Perhaps more crucially it assumes that the transmission
with delay imposes no loss in value to the user. As the number of nodes increases,
more and more messages are queued in transit at the relay nodes. Even though the
9throughput as deﬁned at the beginning of this section does not degrade, the mean
response time of the system does. This may not pose problems for non-real-time
services such as email, but it would not be a suitable solution for any service requiring
bi-directional real-time communication.4 Further, while the overall throughput will
increase with the number of users, the increase of useful data throughput (i.e. non-
redundant data) has yet to be investigated. All these caveats suggest areas for future
research.
5 Policy Implications and Conclusions
Webb and Cave (2003) have suggested a basis for determining how much radio
spectrum should be made available for unlicensed applications, which in the context
of UK legislation means applications speciﬁcally exempted from licensing on an
individual basis. The paper points to the extensive debate taking place in the U.S
surrounding some key new technologies and whether spectrum can be used as a
common resource.
We concur with Webb and Cave’s conclusion that there is no consensus view
from these or other related papers that the regulator may draw on. However, by
providing a rigorous analysis for spectrum commons we oﬀer some conclusions on
this matter. Webb and Cave suggest that a commons approach works where there
is little probability of congestion. However it is still the case that with most tech-
nologies, even those that make use of advanced frequency hopping and avoidance
algorithms, congestion will reduce capacity particularly where the technologies op-
erate in a mixed commons environment. Using the results of Gupta and Kumar
(2000) and Grossglauser and Tse (2002) we have shown that a single mesh tech-
nology solution in a mobile environment can, under certain assumptions about the
randomness of mobile users, transform the tragedy into a triumph of commons. This
is a startling conclusion whose robustness with respect to the modelling assumptions
4We are grateful to Robert Leese for pointing this out.
10is one important area for future research.
Turning to policy implications and opportunities, the most diﬃcult three issues
for the regulator to address are spectrum congestion, bandwidth for high data rate
services and overcoming the rural telecommunications divide. What is needed is a
radically new approach if these three are to be addressed simultaneously. A model
based on an internet with mobility, mesh technology, a common air interface and
adaptive power control has some merit. To use an analogy: if what inhibits the
growth of broadband demand is the cost of deploying base stations then it would
seem sensible to use spare capacity within the mobile terminals to ‘ﬁll in’ by oﬀ-
loading traﬃc in a co-operative manner. The twin challenges for the regulator are
to stimulate the early development of this vision and to accommodate it in the right
spectrum space.
This paper is part of a general research agenda that addresses policy questions in
the area of spectrum allocation by the combination of models from radio engineering
and economics. Our approach complements this literature by oﬀering rigorous mod-
elling of the issues identiﬁed, whilst advancing it by the multidisciplinary approach
adopted.
A valuable result of the formal modelling of spectrum commons is that it allows
us to see the circumstances under which results do (not) hold. Accordingly, this
allows us to think about the factors that inﬂuence where one should draw the line
between diﬀerent policy options. The work we have drawn on (Grossglauser and Tse
(2002)) makes several important assumptions whose relaxation is needed before one
can use them as a basis for policy towards any form of spectrum commons. Thus,
the supply-side externality generated by additional, mobile, consumers will generally
be limited by the distribution of population and typical patterns of activity. Clearly,
it is important to test the robustness of such results to distributional assumptions;
and system simulations to investigate this are required. Also the questions of what
might happen in the model when there are heterogeneous technologies and when
issues like delivery delay needs to be considered for the diﬀerent traﬃc types. These
11also require further research before one can conﬁdently claim any particular triumph
for commons spectrum models.
More practical questions are also raised by our results. If, in a suitably devel-
oped model of mesh technologies, the commons problem is less sever, what sorts
of technologies should be encouraged to take advantage of this? Wireless LANs,
for example, can be seen as a limited multi-hop technology but are they the most
suitable for harnessing the supply-side externalities identiﬁed?
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